MagSolutionsAIMagAudit vs GitGuardian
Written by the people who make one of the two. Read it with that in mind.
Where GitGuardian is genuinely ahead
GitGuardian has scanned every public contribution to GitHub since 2017 and reports detecting over 28.7 million new secrets in public GitHub commits in 2025 (their figure). Its free plan covers teams of up to 25 developers. That reach and that history coverage are not things a one-person product matches, and you should not pick us because you think otherwise.
If what you need is credential patterns across your whole git history, at scale, with a mature incident workflow, they are the better answer.
Where we do something different
| GitGuardian | MagAudit | |
|---|---|---|
| Finds committed credential values | Yes, at scale | Yes, 8 formats |
| Browser-boundary violations a real key in a NEXT_PUBLIC_ variable |
Looks for credential patterns | Yes — the prefix is the finding |
| Scans the code already in the repo at install | — | Yes |
| Dependencies resolved live against PyPI / npm | — | Yes |
| Pricing | Free up to 25 developers, then per seat | Flat, by private repository count |
The boundary case is the one worth understanding. A Supabase
service_role key in NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
is a correctly formatted, legitimate credential. Nothing about the
string is wrong. What is wrong is that the framework compiles it into the
bundle served to every visitor. Pattern matching does not see that; the prefix
does.
We measured how often it appears: 0 times in 63 real pull requests, and in 7 of 8 existing repositories. It is written once, the day the project is created — which is why we scan the existing code when you install rather than waiting for a diff.
Last reviewed: 27 September 2026. On that date we corrected two things on this page: it said GitGuardian detects about 500,000 keys a month, a figure we could not source (their own is above), and it called us a two-person product; it is one person. Every figure about us is our own measurement and reproducible against our public endpoint and our error record. Any figure about another product is either verifiable by you in one step or marked as reported by someone else. Until today this line claimed every figure here was our own measurement, which was not true of all of them.